Testing axiomatizations of ambiguity aversion by Chen, Daniel L. & Schonger, Martin
TESTING AXIOMATIZATIONS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION
Daniel L. Chen and Martin Schonger∗
Abstract
The study of choice under uncertainty has made major advances using thought experiments. We im-
plement a thought experiment involving a choice between two ambiguous acts that have three outcomes,
one being the certainty equivalent of an embedded lottery. Four prominent theories of ambiguity aversion
(multiple priors, rank-dependent, smooth ambiguity preferences, variational preferences) predict indif-
ference. Employing a novel method, we elicit, without deception, a subject’s certainty equivalent of the
embedded lottery. Three experiments are consistent with indifference being rejected. We show indepen-
dence is sufficient for indifference, find empirically that Allais consistency is associated with indifference,
and use recent theory (recursive ambiguity) to explain our results.
JEL Codes: D81
Keywords: Ellsberg paradox, Machina paradox, uncertainty aversion, independence axiom
∗Daniel L. Chen, daniel.chen@iast.fr, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in
Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France; Martin Schonger, mschonger@ethz.ch, ETH
Zurich, Center for Law and Economics. First draft: February 2014. Current draft: August 2019. Most recent
version at: http://users.nber.org/∼dlchen/papers/Testing_Axiomitizations_of_Ambiguity_Aversion.pdf.
For helpful remarks about his thought experiment in relation to our paper we thank Mark Machina. For
helpful comments, we also thank Peter Wakker. Work on this project was conducted while Chen received
financial support from Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (Grant No. 2018-11245), European Research Council
(Grant No. 614708), Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant Nos. 100018-152678 and 106014-150820),
and Agence Nationale de la Recherche.
1
1 Introduction
The development of the normative and positive theory of behavior under uncertainty is
characterized by a series of thought experiments to which scholars or laypersons often give
a “wrong” answer. The St.-Petersburg-Paradox challenged the notion that a lottery will be
evaluated by its expected value (de Montmort 1713), which Bernoulli (1738) accommodated
with a concave utility function instead of the payoffs themselves, later put on normative
foundations by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Allais (1953) subsequently proposed
a thought experiment demonstrating that many people do not exhibit the behavior suggested
by Bernoulli and von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory.1 Ellsberg (1961)
further challenged the notion that decision-makers have a single subjective probability distri-
bution (i.e., are probabilistically sophisticated) with a thought experiment involving choice
over ambiguity. Empirical papers (for a survey see Camerer and Weber, 1992) showed that
people behave differently than probabilistic sophistication prescribes. New models were pro-
posed to accommodate the ambiguity non-neutrality observed in the Ellsberg experiment,
e.g., Schmeidler’s (1989) Choquet model (or Rank-Dependent Utility); Gilboa and Schmei-
dler’s (1989) maximin expected utility; Klibanoff et al.’s (2005) smooth ambiguity; and
Maccheroni et al.’s (2006) Variational Preferences Model. Ambiguity attitudes are now used
to explain puzzles in finance2 and promote policies in health3, law4, and the environment5,
to name a few.
A new thought experiment challenges the prevailing four theories. Machina (2014) proposes
1This inconsistency gave rise to prospect theory, rank-dependent expected utility, and regret theory to
name a few.
2Financial economists, e.g. Erbas and Mirakhor (2007) and Maenhout (2004), attribute part of the equity
premium to aversion to ambiguity.
3Public health initiatives may base their policies on correlations found between measures of ambiguity
aversion and unhealthy behavior (Sutter et al., 2013).
4Ambiguity aversion is argued to result in plea bargaining that is too harsh, as defendants are typically
more ambiguity averse than the prosecutor who also faces a repeated situation. The criminal process therefore
is systematically affected by asymmetric ambiguity aversion, which the prosecution can exploit by forcing
defendants into harsh plea bargains, as Segal and Stein (2005) contend. Ambiguity aversion has also been
applied to contracts (Talley, 2009) and tax compliance (Lawsky, 2013).
5Uncertain risks surrounding environmental protection and medical malpractice have led to calls to provide
more scientific data on ambiguity aversion in individuals’ policy preferences (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2006;
Farber 2010).
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two ambiguous acts, where the four models all predict indifference. The thought experiment
involves three outcomes (classic Ellsberg urns never have more than two outcomes) as shown
in Figure 1. An urn contains 3 balls, exactly 1 of which is red, while the other two could
be both white, both black, or one white and one black ball. The outcomes in this Machina
thought experiment are monetary prizes of $0, $c and $100, where $c ∼ (1
2
, $0; 1
2
, $100), the
certainty equivalent of the lottery of receiving $100 with probability 50% and else $0.
Act L Act H
2 balls 1 ball 1 ball 2 balls︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$0 $c
Red
$100
Red
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$c $100
According to Machina, “If ambiguity aversion somehow involves ‘pessimism,’ mightn’t an
ambiguity averter have a strict preference for [Act] H over [Act] L, just as a risk averter
might prefer bearing risk about higher rather than lower outcome levels?” Indeed, in our
experimental implementation, subjects are not indifferent. However, on average subjects
prefer Act L over Act H. We use Dillenberger and Segal (2015) and Segal’s (1987) recursive
ambiguity in combination with Gul’s (1991) disappointment aversion to give conditions under
which Act L or Act H is preferred. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one
to implement the Machina thought experiment.6
We describe the methodological challenges to implementing the thought experiment with-
out deception. First, we cannot directly ask subjects to state their true valuation of a lottery
and then ask subjects the Machina thought experiment where that just-elicited valuation
appears to increase the values of the acts. It ceases to be optimal to state the true value (for
example, using Becker-Degroot-Marshak (BDM)), since overstating it at the first stage in-
creases the value of the second stage decision. Subjects reading the instructions for the entire
experiment can see how the two tasks are related. Our use of the PRINCE method avoids
deception. Moreover, we raise minimal suspicion from subjects (the two stages are clearly
6A google scholar search as of January 3, 2019 finds no article that does so to date.
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connected, but via the realization of a random draw contained in an envelope, and not via
the certainty equivalent) and without deception (we present the full set of instructions prior
to subjects making any decisions). The PRINCE method, which uses a choice list, also yields
auxiliary data that corroborates the explanation of recursive ambiguity and disappointment
aversion. Namely, with the PRINCE method, we observe the direction of switch (from pre-
ferring Act L to Act H or vice versa) in the choice list as the value (in the yet-to-be-opened
envelope) increases. The envelope is not opened until the end of the experiment.
We contribute evidence that distinguishes between theoretical foundations of ambiguity
aversion. Machina also proposed earlier thought experiments in Machina (2009). Machina
distinguishes his 2014 thought experiment, which is based on a single source of purely sub-
jective uncertainty, unlike Machina (2009), which is based on two. Baillon et al. (2011)
and L’Haridon and Placido (2010) theoretically and empirically investigated Machina’s 2009
thought experiment. Their results complement ours, and together, advance the argument that
the Machina paradoxes falsify many ambiguity theories, at least in the Anscombe-Aumann
framework adopted by those theories with the independence axiom as central. However, we
also show that for decision-makers who satisfy independence (we make precise which inde-
pendence axiom we mean), the Machina thought experiment is problematic. The remainder
of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical observation on the
thought experiment, Section 3 the online implementation, Section 4 the lab, and Section 5
concluding remarks.
2 Machina thought experiment
By replacing $c with the lottery it is induced, the original Machina choice becomes:
Act L’ Act H’
2 balls 1 ball 1 ball 2 balls
1
2
1
2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$0 $0
$0 $100
Red
$100
$100
1
2
1
2
Red
$0
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$0 $100
$100 $100
Figure 1: Machina experiment and reduction
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Note that $0 occurs with one-third probability and $100 occurs with one-third probability.
That is, once we substitute the certainty equivalent c with the underlying lottery, the lotteries
are now identical in their objective and subjective aspects. Thus, one view of the Machina
thought experiment is whether a finding of a strict preference violates four ambiguity aversion
models, or does it show a violation of reduction? By reduction, we mean that a decision-maker
is indifferent to replacing the certainty equivalent as the prize by its underlying lottery.
We make two additional observations. First, probabilistically sophisticated non-Expected
Utility (non-EU) decision makers (DM) can fail to be indifferent. We present an example
(disappointment aversion) where decision makers have a strict preference:
2.1 Example of probabilistically sophisticated DM with ActL  ActH Let the
probabilistic sophisticated DM have: pB = 23 , pW = 0. Then, suppose the DM has non-EU
Gul’s (1991) disappointment aversion (β > 0). Then, for any lottery with 2 outcomes x < x
Gul’s functional is simply: v(lottery) = (1+β)p(x)u(x)+p(x)u(x)
1+βp(x)
. Normalize u(0) = 0, u(100) =
100. Then, u(c) =v($0; 1
2
, $100; 1
2
) =
1
2
100
1+ 1
2
β
= 100
2+β
. Next, v(L) = (1+β)
2
3
u(0)+ 1
3
u(100)
1+β 2
3
= 100
3+2β
and
v(H) =
(1+β) 1
3
u(0)+ 2
3
u(c)
1+β 1
3
= 2u(c)
3+β
= 200
(2+β)(3+β)
. Thus v(H) < v(L) ⇒ Act L  Act H. This
example will be used to also explain our findings.
2.2 Non-probabilistically sophisticated EU DM with Act L ∼ Act H Next, we
show that for any prior, someone who satisfies the independence axiom will be indifferent.
First, the purely objective act is:
Act 0
1 ball 1 ball 1 ball︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
White
$c
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Red
$100
Then, two acts that have ambiguity either at the lower two outcomes or at the higher two
outcomes are:
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Act L Act H
2 balls 1 ball 1 ball 2 balls︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$0 $c
Red
$100
Red
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$c $100
Now consider two acts that are constructed by replacing the certainty equivalent with the
underlying lottery. Note that the acts have an identical mapping from states to outcomes.
This inspires our later claim that the Anscombe-Aumann axiom of Substitution together
with Ordering (completeness and transitivity) and the classical independence axiom from
expected utility theory are sufficient to imply indifference between Machina’s acts L and H.
Act L’ Act H’
2 balls 1 ball 1 ball 2 balls
1
2
1
2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
black white
$0 $0
$0 $100
︷ ︸︸ ︷
red
$100
$100
1
2
1
2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
red
$0
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
black white
$0 $100
$100 $100
2.3 The Anscombe-Aumann Framework These acts have both subjective events
and objective ones, which is why we can represent them in the framework by Anscombe and
Aumann (1963). We follow the exposition by Machina and Schmeidler (1995):
X = {..., x, ...} set of outcomes (e.g., money)
S = {..., s, ...} set of states
R = (x1, p1; ...;xm, pM) a roulette lottery (purely objective)
H = [x1 on E1; ...;xn on En] horse race (purely subjective)
HR = [R1 on E1; ...;Rn on En] horse race
L = {...,L,...} the combined set of all pure roulette, pure horse, and horse/roulette lotteries
Thus in our context we have:
The set of outcomes is X = {0, c, 100}.
The prize c is implicitly defined by c ∼ (1
2
; 0, 1
2
; 100).
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2.4 State space: balls in urn The state space is which balls are in the urn, thus
S = {BB,BW,WB,WW}.
Act 0 (purely objective):
[(1
3
; 0, 1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100)on all states]
Act L (ambiguity at low outcomes):[
(2
3
;0,1
3
;100) on BB; (1
3
; 0, 1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) on BW,WB;(2
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) on WW
]
Act H (ambiguity at high outcomes)[
(1
3
;0,2
3
;c) on BB; (1
3
; 0, 1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) on BW,WB;(1
3
; 0, 2
3
; 100) on WW
]
Act L’ = Act H’:[
(2
3
;0,1
3
;100) on BB; (1
2
; 0, 1
2
; 100) on BW,WB;(1
3
; 0, 2
3
; 100) on WW
]
2.5 State space: ball drawn Instead of using as the state space which balls are in
the urn, it might be more natural to think of the state as the ball drawn. Here the difficulty
is that the ball drawn mixes objective and subjective events. Thus, we can think of the
subjective state space as which ball is drawn conditional on that ball not being red, that is,
have S = {B,W}. Another way of thinking about this is that as the red ball is taken out of
the urn, one ball is drawn from the urn (horse race), and then a roulette wheel is spun where
one third of the fields are red, whereas the rest of the fields have no color but, say, look at
the color of the ball drawn from the urn. This approach has the advantage of yielding far
shorter expressions, as it has 2 states instead of 4.
Act 0 (purely objective):
[(1
3
; 0, 1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100)on all states].
Act L (ambiguity at low outcomes):[
(2
3
;0,1
3
;100) on B; (2
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) on W
]
Act H (ambiguity at high outcomes):[
(2
3
;c,1
3
;0) on B; (2
3
; 100, 1
3
; 0) on W
]
Act L’ and H’:
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[
(2
3
;0,1
3
;100) on B; (1
3
; 0, 2
3
; 100) on W
]
2.6 Informational Symmetry We assume that the DM treats the events B and W
as informationally symmetric. Ensuring or assuming information symmetry is particularly
important in the context of these acts, as White yields a strictly higher prize in both acts.
Informational symmetry means pw = pB in the ball draw state space, and pBB = pWW in
the ball in the urn state space.
2.7 Indifference between the Acts Under what conditions is a DM indifferent be-
tween these Acts? First, observe that by informational symmetry, pW = pB (resp. pWW =
pBB), but then the DM effectively views both L and H as the lottery (13 ; 0,
1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100), and
thus L ∼ H. But more interestingly, what about non-probabilistically sophisticated decision-
makers, when are they indifferent?
2.8 Two kinds of independence AsMachina and Schmeidler (1995) explain, Anscombe-
Aumann has four axioms, in which the first two, Ordering and Mixture Continuity are related
to nonstochastic consumer theory, while the latter two, Substitution and Independence, are
related to expected utility. All four together imply probabilistic sophistication (and expected
utility). Focus here on three of them, abstracting from Mixture Continuity, which we do not
need for present purposes.
Axiom (Ordering) % is a complete, reflexive and transitive binary relation on L .
The following is what Machina and Schmeidler (1995) name the Substitution Axiom, which
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) called the Monotonicity Axiom:
Axiom (Substitution Axiom) For any pair of pure roulette lotteries Pi and Ri: If Pi <
Ri then [P1 on E1; ..;P i on Ei; ..;P n on En] < [R1 on E1; ..;Ri on Ei; ..Rn on En] for all
partitions {E1, ..., En} and all roulette lotteries {R1, ..., Ri−1, Ri+1, ..., Rn}.
The next axiom of Anscombe-Aumann, is an independence axiom, but they generalized
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it to apply to horse race/roulette lotteries, which is why we call it Horse-Race/Roulette-
Independence:
Axiom (Horse-Race/Roulette-Independence Axiom) For any partition {E1, ..., En} and
roulette lotteries {P1, ..., Pn} and {R1, ..., Rn}:
If [P1 on E1; ...;P n on En] < [R1 on E1; ...;Rn on En]
then [αP 1 + (1− α)Q1on E1; ...;αP n + (1− α)Qnon En]
< [αR1 + (1− α)Q1on E1; ...;αRn+(1− α)Qnon En]
for all probabilities α(0, 1] and all roulette lotteries {Q1, ..., Qn}.
By contrast, the classical Independence Axiom (for pure roulette lotteries from expected-
utility theory) is the following, and for clarity, we call it Roulette-Independence:
Axiom (Roulette-Independence Axiom) For all pure roulette-lotteries R,P,Q, and all α(0, 1]
If R < P then αR + (1− α)Q < αP + (1− α)Q.
The Horse Race/Roulette-Independence Axiom implies the Roulette-Independence Ax-
iom, while the converse is not true. Indeed the Horse Race/Roulette-Independence Axiom
together with the other 3 Anscombe-Aumann axioms implies probabilistic sophistication,
while Roulette-Independence does not. Many major theories of ambiguity aversion (as they
are theories that allow for ambiguity non-neutrality) violate the Horse-Race/Roulette Inde-
pendence Axiom, but satisfy Roulette-Independence:
Remark The Multiple Priors, the Rank-Dependent Model, the Smooth Ambiguity Pref-
erences Model, and the Variational Preferences Model satisfy Roulette-Independence.
2.9 Roulette-Independence: Bernoulli without Bayes?
Claim A decision-maker who satisfies the Ordering, Roulette-Independence, and Substi-
tution Axioms is indifferent between Act L and Act H.
Proof: We prove this separately in both state spaces:
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1. State space: Balls in Urn:
By Roulette-Independence, we have (2
3
; 0, 1
3
; 100) ∼ (1
3
;0,2
3
;c), and (2
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) ∼ (1
3
; 0, 2
3
; 100).
But then the Substitution Axiom implies that L ∼ H, since one can substitute these lotteries
on BB and WW , respectively.
2. State space: Ball Drawn:
By Roulette-Independence, we have (2
3
; 0, 1
3
; 100) ∼ (2
3
;c,1
3
;0), and (2
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) ∼ (1
3
; 0, 2
3
; 100).
But then the Substitution Axiom implies that L ∼ H, since one can substitute these lotteries
on B and W respectively. Q.E.D.
2.10 Indifference between subjective and objective lottery? Note that Substi-
tution and Roulette-Independence, unlike probabilistic sophistication, do not imply indif-
ference between the horse-race/roulette lotteries L and H on the one hand, and the pure
roulette lottery that is Act 0:
Example (Multiple Priors) Let us use a simple version of the multiple priors model. Let
the priors be p1W = 0 and p2W = 1. The DM evaluates each Act by the expected utility
that nature chooses the worst prior for her. We normalize her Bernoulli utility function with
u(0) = 0, u(100) = 100, which implies u(c) = 50. Thus, the DM evaluates the acts as follows:
V (Act 0) = 1
3
0 + 1
3
c + 1
3
100 = 50, V (Act L) = min
{
2
3
0 + 0· c+ 1
3
100, 0· 0 + 2
3
· c+ 1
3
100
}
=
331
3
, V (Act H) = min
{
1
3
0 + 2
3
· c+ 0· 100, 1
3
0 + 0· c+ 2
3
· 100} = 331
3
. Thus, while the DM
satisfies Roulette-Independence, she still is ambiguity averse as: Act 0  Act L ∼ Act H.
What about our illustrative Acts L’ and H’? Under Substitution and Independence, we
have: Act L’ ∼ Act L ∼ Act H.
3 Online Study
The online study used MTurk. This setting allows stakes that can appear low relative to lab
settings. MTurkers often do data entry tasks (among other tasks difficult for computers to
do but easy for humans to do). A paragraph takes about 100 seconds to enter so a payment
of 10 cents per paragraph is equivalent to $86.40 per day. The current federal minimum
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wage in the Unites States is $58/day. In India, payment rate depends on the type of work
done, although the "floor" for data entry positions appears to be about $6.38/day. In one
data entry study, one worker emailed (one of the authors) saying that $0.10 was too high
and that the typical payment for this sort of data entry was $0.03 cents per paragraph. We
should see equal proportions for each choice to the extent low stakes bias subjects towards
indifference. We use MTurk also to illustrate the intuition for the lab experiment, which is
our main contribution.
We had 213 participants in session 1. Instructions are in Appendix A. We replaced $c
with the lottery it is induced by, and asked individuals to choose an urn (lottery). For the
purposes of the results discussion and continuity with the theoretical discussion, we refer to
Act L’ (ambiguity at low outcome) and Act H’ (ambiguity at high outcome). The ordering
of the urns L’ and H’ was randomized (“A” and “B” in the instructions were in a fixed order,
but assigned arbitrarily) for the subjects. A design choice was the number of balls to put
in the urn. Machina parsimoniously fills his opaque urn with 1 known and 2 unknown balls.
Experience shows that then some subjects assume some symmetric objective probability
distribution is implied, and they mechanically start calculating the resulting distribution
of this compound lottery. We avoid this by having 20 known and 40 unknown balls. This
serves three purposes. First, it makes the mechanical thoughtless calculation harder. Second,
it makes examples better for the experimenter, “for example, 7 black and 33 white balls”.
Third, Ellsberg also proposed a large number of balls. We found that Act L’ was chosen by
123 participants (58%). A two-sided t-test rejects the null hypothesis that this preference for
Act L’ is random, at a significance level of 5% (p = 0.0234).
We had 432 subjects in a second session. Instructions are slightly different and worded in
Appendix B. We used oTree (Chen et al. 2016). Among these 432 subjects, 64% preferred
Act L’. Appendix C reports demographic correlates of choice for readers who are interested
in cross-cultural determinants of ambiguity aversion and demographic determinants of risk
aversion (Weber and Hsee 1998; Von Gaudecker et al. 2011). On the basis of the results de-
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scribed thus far, despite the wording being slightly different across the two sessions, subjects
appear to act contrary to what Machina thought where 100% of subjects would preference
[Act] H over [Act] L. On average, ambiguity at low outcomes was preferred to ambiguity at
higher outcomes.
4 Lab Study
4.1 Design We ran the lab experiment at the DeSciL lab following their standard
procedures in ETH Zurich using paper-and-pencil, for reasons described below. We had 91
participants across 6 sessions. Rather than replacing $c with the lottery it is induced by
as in Figure 1, we sought to recover $c through revealed preference. If the decision-maker
has a preference relation which satisfies continuity, then a certainty equivalent is guaranteed
to exist; strict monotonicity in the monetary outcomes ensures uniqueness. However, the
certainty equivalent of a subject is unknown to the experimenter.
The main challenge is to elicit the subject’s certainty equivalent prior to conducting the
Machina thought experiment. The state-of-the-art method to experimentally elicit willing-
ness to pay for an object is still BDM (Becker et al. 1964). BDM can be implemented by
the mechanism itself or a simplified “list” method. In the mechanism, people are asked to
state their true valuation, a price is randomly drawn, and they receive the object at the
random price if their stated valuation is above it. In the “list” method, people are presented
with a list of choices, each consisting of two options, the object and a valuation, and one of
the indicated choices is then selected at random. From a formal point of view, the two are
close cousins, the difference being that in the list method the valuation one can state is quite
coarse.7 Regardless of the method, subjects are usually told that correctly stating their true
valuation is optimal.
However, since the elicited value is later used in the Machina paradox, it ceases to be
7Practically, however, there are differences: in the list method, participants may frame each choice as
separate, and not view themselves as confronting a big lottery, thus even if independence does not hold, the
mechanism would work. The mechanism itself is also quite unusual for non-economists and it is far from
obvious to subjects that truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Thus, usually subjects get the opportunity to
practice with the mechanism and are explicitly told that correctly stating their true valuation is optimal.
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optimal to state the true value, but rather overstating it becomes optimal. Moreover, since
the probability of receiving the certainty equivalent in the Machina thought experiment is
subjective, it is not possible to correct for that incentive. For these reasons, we use the
PRINCE method.8 The PRINCE (PRior INCEntive system) method is like the list method
and formally equivalent to BDM (Johnson et al. 2015). In brief, the choice question (rather
than choice options) and implemention is randomly selected before (rather than after) the
experiment. It is provided to the subjects in a tangible form (for example in a sealed en-
velope). Subjects’ answers are framed as instructions to the experimenter about the real
choice implemented at the end: in the PRINCE method instead of $c, one asks subjects for
instructions for which a lottery is preferred for all possible $c (See Appendix D, especially
D.2). It has the advantage over the list method in that it allows any answer, not just an
answer on the list (so the valuations are not elicited coarsely). Also, the envelope is already
there, and framing as “give us instructions” might lessen concerns of subjects seeing this as
a big lottery when eliciting CE. Moreover, reading the instructions makes clear that isola-
tion across tasks is maximally salient. Finally, to further accentuate isolation, the tasks are
printed on different colored paper (these colors are reproduced in Appendix D.4). We also
offer subjects “indifference” as an option to directly express their indifference rather than
infer it from the population (as in the online study).
It is worth highlighting how PRINCE contrasts with the usual BDM for the Machina
thought experiment. First, we do not directly ask subjects to state their true valuation of
a lottery and then ask subjects the Machina thought experiment where that just-elicited
valuation appears to increase the values of the acts. Subjects reading the instructions for
the entire experiment would easily realize how the two tasks are related. Note that eliciting
valuations of the lottery from subjects without their full awareness of the entire experiment
would involve deception. Our use of the PRINCE method avoids deception. The lottery
whose valuation is being elicited appears as “Option A” in Task 2. Notice further that the
8The PRINCE method was also originally designed to test for endowment effects, so its application to the
Machina thought experiment is new.
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realization of the random draw, X, is inside an envelope that they hold. This X is then used
in the Machina thought experiment. We then ask subjects to choose between the acts for
every possible value of X. The connection of the envelope’s content across tasks is maximally
salient to subjects. What we use, as the experimenter, is the valuation reported in Task 2 to
locate the actual comparison of interest among the 20 choice decisions in Task 3. Thus, we
raise minimal suspicion from subjects (there is a clear connection between Task 2 and Task
3) and without deception (we present the full set of instructions prior to subjects making
any decisions).
To familiarize subjects with PRINCE, we first used it for a first order stochastic domi-
nance (FOSD) task (See Appendix D.1) and then for CE. Since the Machina experiment is
implemented with the list method, we can explore if subjects have a unique switching point.
A priori it is not clear that people have a unique switching point nor direction.
4.2 Discussion This section discusses the formal conditions under which preferences
would imply a threshold. Assume that preferences are strictly monotonic in money. Note
that then there should be a certainty equivalent and it should fall between $0 and $100.
Now, consider an arbitrary x such that 0 < x < 100.
Act 1 Act 2
2 balls 1 ball 1 ball 2 balls︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$0 $x
Red
$100
Red
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$x $100
Figure 2: Machina experiment
4.2.1. Which preferences imply a threshold x?
A natural question is whether we can still make the argument that independence would
be a sufficient condition for DM to be indifferent between the lotteries. The answer to that
question is no. An example to see why, consider the case of a small x close to 0, and a
subjective expected utility (SEU) decision-maker who believes that the probability of black
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is zero and that of white is 2
3
. This decision maker will prefer Act H (which gives her $100
with probability 2
3
) over Act L (which gives her $100 with probability 1
3
). Consider the
following simple example to show how people can switch: EU(L) = 1
3
100 + pWu(x) and
EU(H) = pW100 + pBu(x).
Example 1, pW = 0:
EU(L) = 1
3
100 and EU(H) = 2
3
u(x), thus Act L < Act H iff x < c
Example 2, pB = 0:
EU(L) = 1
3
100 + 2
3
u(x) and EU(H) = 2
3
100, thus Act H < Act L iff x < c
Example 3, pW = pB = 13 :
EU(L) = 1
3
100 + 1
3
u(x) and EU(H) = 1
3
100 + 1
3
u(x), thus Act L ∼ Act H for all x
4.2.2. Probabilistic sophistication and SEU
Slightly more generally, since SEU implies probabilistic sophistication, we assume that
p(White) = pw, where pb + pw = 23 , and assume u(0) = 0, u($100) = 1. Then u(c) =
1
2
and
0 < u(x) < 1. Then SEU(Act L) = pw · u(x) + 13 · 1 and SEU(Act H) = pb · u(x) + pw · 1.
Thus, the following holds:
for pw > pb :
for pw = pb = 13 :
for pw < pb :
Act L < Act H ⇔ x ≥ c
Act L ∼ Act H
Act L < Act H ⇔ x ≤ c
Thus, there might be indifference, or there might be a threshold in one direction or the
other.
4.2.3. Probabilistic sophistication and RDU
Alternatively, under rank dependent utility (RDU), let the probability distortion/weighting
function be f . Given this belief,
RDEU(Act L) = f (pw) · 0 + (f (pw + pb)− f (pw)) · u(x) + (1− f (pw + pb)) · 1
= (f (pw + b)− f (pw)) · u(x) + 1− f (pw + pb)
and
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RDEU(Act H) = f(1
3
) · 0 + (f (pw + 13)− f (13)) · u(x) + (1− f (pw + 13)) · 1
=
(
f
(
pw +
1
3
)− f (1
3
)) · u(x) + 1− f (pw + 13)
Thus, there are three cases:
for pw > pb :
for pw = pb = 13 :
for pw < pb :
Act L  Act H
Act L ∼ Act H
Act H  Act L
4.2.4. Non-probabilistically sophisticated beliefs/preferences
Since the event black always yields a worse outcome than the event white, in this situation
the multiple priors model is behaviorally identical to a model with probabilistic sophistication
and subjective probability of Black equal to 2
3
, that of White equal to 0. Thus, we are in the
case of pw < pb : Act L < Act H ⇔ x ≤ c.
4.3 Results Consistent with the online study, we find that subjects prefer the act with
ambiguity at the low outcome relative to the act with ambiguity at the high outcome. Figure
3 easily rejects indifference (only 12 out of 91 subjects explicitly express indifference).
Figure 3: All participants
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Next, we use the switching point from the list method to infer indifference between Act L
and ActH. In Figure 3, subjects are classified as indifferent when they are indifferent at their
CE (and two neighboring values). Next, we add those who have a clear switching point and
their CE lies in the confidence interval of this switching point. In other words, individuals
can simply report indifference at CE ± 1. In addition, we can label subjects as indifferent
if CE ∈ {S − 1.96 · SD([CE − S]);S + 1.96 · SD([CE − S])}, where S is the switching
point in Task 3. More precisely, S is the average value between the last A/B and first B/A
for single-switchers. SD is calculated for [CE − S].9 In reality there are people for whom
CE strongly differs from S, and thus our confidence interval is too wide. We therefore may
overestimate the number of people who are indifferent.
Next, we present an analysis of switching. We present the number of participants who fall
into different categories: (i) switch from Ambiguity at Low to Ambiguity at High, (ii) switch
from Ambiguity at High to Ambiguity at Low, (iii) always choose Ambiguity at Low, (iv)
always choose Ambiguity at High, (v) always indifferent, and (vi) other.
Figure 4: All participants
9This means that under the null hypothesis that everyone has CE = S, we treat any difference between
CE and S as measurement error.
17
Three results emerge from the tabulation. First, almost a fifth of subjects do not switch.
They strictly prefer Act L or strictly prefer Act H. There is a slight greater preference for
ambiguity at low outcomes than for ambiguity at high outcomes. Second, switchers switch
from ambiguity at low to ambiguity at high as X increases, which is what one might expect
if subjects have a preference for non-ambiguity at high outcomes.10 Third, there exists many
people for whom CE strongly differs from S. Thus even allowing subjects to directly express
indifference and inferring as many subjects as possible to be indifferent from their switching
points, we can reject indifference in the Machina thought experiment. Appendix E presents
additional tabulations that support this claim.
To see additionally how we can reject indifference, we visualize the separation between
subjects’ CE and switching points. Figure 4 plots the CE on the x-axis and the switching
point on the y-axis.
Figure 5: CE vs. Switching point (raw data)
In each subplot, the 45 degree line is the CE = S line. This sample includes people who
10This can be seen by considering the extreme case where X = 20 and observing that non-ambiguity
is now maximized at the high outcomes. The order of the lottery presentation was randomized, but even
with the reversed order, the majority of subjects switch from Ambiguity at Low to Ambiguity at High (See
Appendix G).
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always prefer A or always prefer B (their switching point is represented as 20) and people
with single switching points. Each subplot presents a different sample in robustness checks.
Clockwise from the upper left: (i) All participants, (ii) CE ∈ [4, 10], (iii) FOSD, (iv) both.
The null hypothesis of indifference at X = CE appears to be rejected because the dots are
far away from the 45 degree line. Appendix F visualizes a regression line for “folded” data
(we fold the data because we do not want to average the responses of some subjects who
switch above their CE and other subjects who switch below their CE) and the confidence
interval for the regression line excludes this 45 degree line. A t-test can strongly reject the
null that the mean of abs(CE − S) = 0 with t-statistic of 7.8.
4.4 Allais and Machina paradoxes Next, we present sub-sample analysis, dividing
subjects by whether they are Allais consistent (i.e., satisfying independence) or inconsistent.
Subjects are classified as indifferent when they express indifference at their CE (and two
neighboring values) or when they have a clear switching point and their CE lies in the
confidence interval of this switching point. Indifference appears to depend on the answer to
Allais (see the questionnaire in Appendix D). Those who are more Allais consistent are more
likely to be indifferent, and we previously argued that satisfying the independence axiom is
sufficient for indifference.
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Figure 6: Allais and Machina paradoxes
4.5 Predictions about direction of switch We use Dillenberger and Segal (2015)
and Segal’s (1987) recursive ambiguity in combination with Gul’s (1991) disappointment
aversion to give conditions under which Act L or Act H is preferred. When subjects are
disappointment averse, we should observe switching from Act L to Act H, which is what we
found.
The value of Acts are computed as the weighted average of values of first-stage lotteries,
with weights being subjective probabilities of different states of the world: BB,BW,WW .
WAct L = qBB · VAct L(BB) + qBWVAct L(BW ) + qWWVAct L(WW )
WAct H = qBB · VAct H(BB) + qBWVAct H(BW ) + qWWVAct H(WW )
Since terms for state BW are the same for both urns (same payoffs), we may neglect them
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for comparison purposes. Let’s now take Gul’s disappointment aversion model with β as the
disappointment aversion parameter:
VAct L(BB) =
2
3
(1 + β) · 0 + 1
3
· 100
1 + 2
3
β
=
100
3 + 2β
VAct L(WW ) =
2
3
(1 + β) ·X + 1
3
· 100
1 + 2
3
β
=
100 + 2(1 + β)X
3 + 2β
VAct H(BB) =
1
3
(1 + β) · 0 + 2
3
·X
1 + 1
3
β
=
2X
3 + β
VAct H(WW ) =
1
3
(1 + β) · 0 + 2
3
· 100
1 + 1
3
β
=
200
3 + β
So Act L is preferred to Act H if:
qBB
100(1+β)
3+2β
+ qWW
100+2(1+β)X
3+2β
> qBB
2X(1+β)
3+β
+ qWW
200
3+β
For qWW = qBB (assuming equal probabilities of having two black balls or two white
balls)11: 100β > 2Xβ
We now divide by β. Let’s first assume that β > 0:
50 > X
So if X < 50, Act L is preferred over Act H. Therefore, as X increases we should observe
a switch from Act L to Act H, which is what we find.
If we now go back and assume that β < 0:
11Derivation:
100(1 + β)
3 + 2β
+
100 + 2(1 + β)X
3 + 2β
>
2X(1 + β)
3 + β
+
200
3 + β
· (3 + β)(3 + 2β)
2(1 + β)(3 + β)100 + 2(1 + β)(3 + β)X > (3 + 2β)2X(1 + β) + 200(3 + 2β)
600 + 300β + 6X(1 + β) + 200β + 100β2 + 2X(1 + β)β > 600 + 6X(1 + β) + 400β + 4X(1 + β)β
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50 < X
So if X > 50, Act L is preferred over Act H. Therefore, as X increases we should observe
a switch from Act H to Act L.
5 Concluding Remarks
The thought experiment we test is the latest in a series of seminal thought experiments to
push the frontiers of both theoretical and empirical research on choice under uncertainty. In
this thought experiment, major theories of ambiguity aversion predict indifference. We argue
that probabilistically sophisticated non-EU DM can fail to be indifferent. We present an
example (disappointment aversion) where decision makers have a strict preference. Second,
someone who satisfies the independence axiom will be indifferent. Machina’s thought experi-
ment to test of major theories of ambiguity non-neutrality appears at least as much a test of
independence as of ambiguity aversion. We overcome a challenge to implementing Machina’s
thought experiment, which requires knowledge of a subject’s certainty equivalent, using the
PRINCE method. We also find a strong pattern in which way people shift (in our elicitation
of Machina’s thought experiment). This shift is used to support recursive ambiguity as an
axiomitization of ambiguity aversion.
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Appendix:
A Instructions For Online Study (session 1)
Appendix Figure A.1
26
B Instructions For Online Study (session 2)
Appendix Figure A.2: Choice of lottery
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C Demographic Correlates of Choice
We also had demographic characteristics for 333 subjects. In linear probability models, Republicans were
22 percentage points more likely to prefer Act L’. Americans were 48 percentage points and Asians were 27
percentage points more likely to prefer Act H’. Marginal effects from logit and probit models were similar.
We did not see significant differences in choice of ambiguity at high or low outcomes by gender (which is the
focal demographic heterogeneity of a recent study on gender differences in ambiguity aversion (Borghans et
al. 2009)).
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(1) (2)
chooseA chooseA
Mean dep. Var. 0.36 0.37
Male 0.0564
(0.0559)
Age 0.00200
(0.00249)
Republican -0.215**
(0.102)
Democrat -0.0398
(0.0842)
American 0.475*
(0.280)
Indian 0.438
(0.290)
Black 0.112
(0.120)
Hispanic 0.116
(0.116)
Native American -0.0419
(0.173)
Asian 0.270**
(0.107)
Hindu 0.0489
(0.115)
Catholic -0.0594
(0.0934)
Religious Services 0.00468
(0.0218)
Constant 0.359*** -0.260
(0.0231) (0.291)
N 432 333
R-sq 0.000 0.107
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
Correlates of Urn A Choice
Appendix Figure A.3: Regression analysis
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D Instructions For Lab Study
The first task is the first order stochastic dominance task. The second task is the CE task. The third task
is the Machina task. The fourth task is a short survey questionnaire shown at the end.
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D.1 First Order Stochastic Dominance Task Note that first order stochastic dominance implies
that option B is always preferred when X is less than 7.
Appendix Figure A.4: Envelope content - FOSD
Appendix Figure A.5: Answer sheet - FOSD
31
D.2 Certainty Equivalent Task (PRINCE method) Note that someone who is risk averse would
write down X less than 10.
Appendix Figure A.6: Envelope content - CE
Appendix Figure A.7: Answer sheet - CE
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D.3 Machina Task Note that someone who satisfies SEU would have a unique switching point when
X is CE.
Appendix Figure A.8: Envelope content - Machina
Appendix Figure A.9: Answer sheet - Machina
33
D.4 Complete Instructions For completeness, we include all relevant information seen by the sub-
jects. The original colors for the experiment tasks are reproduced.
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Appendix Figure A.10: FOSD Task
35
Appendix Figure A.11: CE Task
36
Appendix Figure A.12: Machina Task (page 1)
37
Appendix Figure A.13: Machina Task (page 2)
38
Appendix Figure A.14: Questionnaire (page 1)
39
Appendix Figure A.15: Questionnaire (page 2)
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E Additional Analysis of Switching Points
Next, we restrict to participants with a certainty equivalent between 4 and 10, inclusive. The results are
similar as without the restriction.
Appendix Figure A.16: Participants with reasonable CE
The following tabulation indicates there exists many people for whom CE strongly differs from S:
Count Share in %
CE inside switch interval 20 46.5
CE outside switch interval 23 53.5
Total 43 100
Appendix Figure A.17: Whether CE is inside Machina switching point interval
We also present the number of observations for specific combinations of CE and S values:
CE<10 CE=10 CE>10
S<10 14 4 4
S=10 1 1 0
S>10 5 6 9
Appendix Figure A.18: 2x2 table of CE vs. Switching point
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F Additional Regression Analysis of CE and Switching Points
This figure visualizes a regression line and replaces the some dots with bars when subjects report indiffer-
ence for a range rather than the data indicating a switching point. On this evidence, the confidence interval
for the regression line excludes the 45 degree line for the entire set of participants. Smaller samples of the
data would not reject the null.
Appendix Figure A.19: CE vs. Switching point (folded, with regression line)
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G Order Effects
The order of the lottery presentation was randomized, but we can check if the order influenced the switch
direction. We find that the answer is yes, but people still generally switch from Ambiguity at Low to
Ambiguity at High.
Fraction of switches from Risk at Low Outcome to Risk at High Outcome depending on
the order of options on the answer sheet (normal order lists Risk at High Outcome first).
Group Obs Mean Std Dev
Normal Order 32 .13 .34
Reversed order 11 .18 .4
H0: means are equal; p-value for two-sided test: 0.648
Appendix Figure A.20: Order and switch direction
The tabulation indicates that the fraction of switches from Ambiguity at High to Ambiguity at Low
depends on the order of options on the answer sheet (normal order lists Ambiguity at Low Outcome first).
But even with the reversed order, the majority of subjects switch from Ambiguity at Low to Ambiguity at
High.
43
